Defensible Security Architecture

Design principles and ATT&CK

Säkerhetskryssningen 2019



Mattias Almefic The Security Engine	
2018 NIXU cybersecurity.	Principal Security Consultant
2017 COMBITECH	 Senior Information Security Architect Specializing in military security frameworks Threat driven IT-security implementations
2016 SAAB	 Team Leader Information Security Architect Part of the founding team of Saab Cyber Security Division Systems Integrator Information Security Architect Team Leader IT security, Systems Engineering, Team Leader
2010 SAAB Defence and Security	 Thesis Worker Software Developer Databases, .NET software development
2 22.5.2019	References per slide, at the end. NIXU PUBLIC NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED

Mattias Almeflo And the domains of warfare


2017 – Development Environments (H/S)



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2016 – 2017: **Cyber** R&D Defensive Cyber Warfare



2013 – 2015: **Air** Windows Security in L16 Backbone (H/S, NS)




2015 – 2016: **Naval** Docker Security in naval systems (H/S)



2010 – 2013: **Land** Created the Secure Operating Environment (SOE) for the Swedish Army (H/R)

References per slide, at the end.





The complexity of the domain is staggering

References per slide, at the end.

Trusted go-to partner for cybersecurity services

Sweden Finland



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Defensible Security Architecture SANS SEC530

- Traditional Security Architecture Deficiencies
- Defensible Security Architecture
- Threat, Vulnerability, and Data Flow Analysis
- Layer 1 Best Practices
- Layer 2 Best Practices
- NetFlow

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Defensible Security Architecture SANS SEC530.1

Defensible Security Architecture

- Mindset
- Models
- Virtual Networking / Software-defined Networking
- Micro-Segmentation

Threat, Vulnerability, and Data Flow Analysis

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Two types of threats

Non actor driven (not antagonistic) threat

- Possible, unwanted event with a negative outcome for operations, which isn't caused by a human actors deliberate actions.
- Generally speaking non-antagonistic threats can be divided into three categories:
 - Natural phenomena (natural disasters, disease)
 - Errors in technical systems (bugs, malfunction)
 - Non-intentional actions by human actors (accidents, negligence)

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Two types of threats

Actor driven (antagonistic) threat

- Threat driven by an actor in the form of an individual, group, network, organisation, state etc.
- Actor driven threats are normally intentional.

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The post-breach / "assume breach" age

"High-risk enterprises should assume that they are already compromised

- there is no product or combination of products that provides 100% protection"


2012, NSS Labs Analysis,
 Brief – Cybercrime Kill Chain vs. Defense Effectiveness

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References per slide, at the end.

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The post-breach / "assume breach" age **Dwell time – Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends 2018 report**



MITRE's "assume breach" initiative

and the rise of the ATT&CK framework

History:

- 2010 researching data sources and analytic processes for detecting APTs more quickly through the use of endpoint telemetry data
- 2013 developed a process for modeling an adversary's post-compromise behavior at a granular level. This model is named ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge).
- 2015 ATT&CK methodology is released to the world
- 2018 The first dedicated ATT&CK conference

References per slide, at the end.



ATT&CK – A more scientific way

Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge

An empirical/curated knowledge base that helps model cyber adversaries' tactics and techniques – and then shows how to detect or stop them.

- The real hacker playbook (+200 techniques)
- Threat-informed
- Community driven
- Free



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Think like an attacker

"Think like a chef and see how well you do in the kitchen..."

- Adam Shostack

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Threat modeling

strategically thinking about what might go wrong

"something you can do while preparing to deploy or build a system is to think about the threats associated with it."

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Threat modeling

Shostack's four questions

- 1. What are you deploying/building?
- 2. What can go wrong?
- 3. What are you going to do about it?
- 4. Did you do an acceptable job at 1-3? (For quality assurance)

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ATT&CK Matrix Use Cases

they start with the threat

- Gap analysis of current defences
 - Improve the security posture
- **Detection** of heavily used techniques
 - Prioritize what analysts should to look for
- Information sharing of observed behaviours on the network
 - Help collaboration among security teams
- Tracking the evolution of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) over time.
 - Build adversary profiles

Adversary emulation

• More authentic red team/blue team exercises

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ATT&CK A moving target



It's been about a year since we wrote about <u>what was coming for ATT&CK in 2018</u>...and what a year it's been. We started from the ground up by making some big changes to ATT&CK itself, including <u>developing a new tactic</u> to capture how adversaries achieve <u>Initial Access</u>. We launched a new technical infrastructure, including a <u>redesigned website</u> and <u>STIX/TAXII-based JSON</u> <u>API</u>. We published the <u>ATT&CK Navigator</u> to help you visualize and explore ATT&CK, <u>relaunched CAR</u> to help you detect ATT&CK techniques, and conducted our first round of <u>ATT&CK Evaluations</u> to drive ATT&CK adoption and implementation by both vendors and end-users. We also launched this blog, with some great posts on <u>threat intelligence mapping</u>, <u>finding related</u> <u>ATT&CK techniques</u>, and <u>how to interpret ATT&CK Evaluation detections</u>. I think I speak for the team when I say our high point was meeting so many of you in person at our first ATT&CKcn.

15829122NEW TACTICNEW TECHNIQUESNEW GROUPSNEW SOFTWARE2018 ATT&CK Changes

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APT groups aka advance threat actors

Advanced Persistent Threat groups came to light in 2013

Currently the ATT&CK framework have 78 different threat actors in its catalogue.

Roughly 43% are attributed to countries

- 13 are presumed to be Chinese-based
- 12 are presumed to be Iranian-based
- 7 are presumed to be Russia-based
- 2 are presumed to be North Korea-based

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The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK

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PRE ATT&CK

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The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK



ENTERPRISE ATT&CK

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
The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK





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Enterprise ATT&CK focus areas (tactics)

- Initial Access
- Execution
- Persistence
- Privilege Escalation
- Defense Evasion
- Credential Access
- Discovery
- Lateral Movement
- Collection
- Exfiltration
- Command and Control

References per slide, at the end.



The post-breach / "assume breach" age

and how ATT&CK can help you leverage what you already have

- "Think like an attacker" by studying their blueprints
- 2. Fighting the <u>digital</u> sleeper agents of modern IT-systems by behaviour monitoring through Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)



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The digital sleeper agents of modern IT-systems

or the rise of Living Of the Land Binaries (LOLBins)

Living of the land binaries:

- Authorized, trusted applications that are used by malicious actors
- Usually never writes to disk (they are already there)
 - Live in memory
- Be one with the network
 - Use tools already in place, use protocols already used
 - (Don't talk when the network is quiet)
 - Make their infrastructure work for you

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References per slide, at the end.



ATT&CK - living off the land binaries (LOLBins)

or homesteading in the enterprise with fileless attacks

"Fileless Malware Attacks on the Rise, Microsoft Says" – 2018, october

- LOLBins have been around in the wild since 2014
- Recently experienced explosive growth
 - 52% of non-malware attacks in 2017 involved the abuse of two legitimate programs (powershell & WMI)
 - increasing at a rate of 6.8% per month

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References per slide, at the end.

Simple examples of TTP

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

TTP in a windows environment


• "a privilege escalation via the Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) "

Using a non-cyber analogy

 "a specific approach to counterfeiting \$100 dollar bills can be thought of as a TTP while the specific guidance for detecting bills (wrong color, bad watermark, etc.) using this approach can be thought of as Indicators."


References per slide, at the end.

Biancos "Pyramid of Pain"



How to start with ATT&CK

Tactics: the adversary's technical goals



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


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How to start with ATT&CK

Tactics – Techniques – Threat Groups - Tools





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How to start with ATT&CK

Work from tactics and break it down from there








Defensible Architecture

Separation as a security boundary



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Security Design principles

There are many sets of security design principles

They share a lot of similarities between them at a fundamental level

For defensible architecture I recommend to start with these ten (10) security design principles

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Security Design Principle

A declarative **statement** made with the intention of **guiding security design decisions** in order to meet the security goals of a system

References per slide, at the end.

- 1. Assign the **least privilege** possible
- 2. Separate responsibilities
- 3. Trust cautiously
- 4. Simplest solution possible
- 5. Audit sensitive events

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References per slide, at the end.

- 6. Fail securely & use secure defaults
- 7. Never rely upon obscurity
- 8. Implement defence in depth
- 9. Never invent security technology
- 10. Find the weakest link

# 01	LEAST PRIVILEGE
Why?	Broad privileges allow malicious or accidental access to protected resources
Principle	Limit privileges to the minimum for the context
Tradeoff	Less convenient, less effecient, more complexity
Example	 Run server processes as their own users with exactly the set of privileges they require No root or super-admin access, ever

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References per slide, at the end.

# 02	SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITIES AND SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
Why?	Achieve control and accountability, limit the impact of successful attacks, make attacks less attractive
Principle	Separate and compartmentalised responsibilities, privilegies and admin/user systems
Tradeoff	Development and testing costs, operational complexity, troubleshooting more difficult
Example	 System admin are separate from security log admin admin interfaces are not allowed to run in the same domain as user interfaces

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References per slide, at the end.

# 03	TRUST CAUTIOUSLY
Why?	Many security problems caused by inserting malicious inntermediaries in communication paths
Principle	Assume unknown entities are untrusted, have a clear process to establish trust, validate who is connecting
Tradeoff	Operational complexity (particularly failure recovery), reliability, some developement overhead. Not a trivial problem
Example	 Two-way-authentication (client – server) Two-factor authentication for user auth Only use trusted PKI that you control Never share underlying HW for VMs in different sec. domains

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# 04	SIMPLEST SOLUTION POSSIBLE	"The price of reliability is the
Why?	Security requires understanding of the design – complex design is rarely understood – simplicity allows analysis.	pursuit of the utmost simplicity"
Principle	Actively design for simplicity – avoid complex failure modes, implicit behaviour, unnecesary features	– C.A.R. Hoare
Tradeoff	Hard decisions on features and sophistication. Needs serious design effort to be simple.	
Example	 Fixed configuration (defined configuration as in CIS Benchmarks) Hardening (minimize attack surface) in terms of no unused services 	

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References per slide, at the end.

# 05	AUDIT & ANALYZE SENSITIVE EVENTS
Why?	Provide record of activity, deter wrong doing, provide a log to reconstruct the past, provide a monitoring point
Principle	Record all security significant events in a tamper-resistant store
Tradeoff	Performance, operational complexity, development cost
Example	 Record all unsuccessful login attempts, IPS/IDS events of relevance Use a data-diod in order to safe guard the security logs

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# 06	FAIL SECURELY & USE SECURE DEFAULTS
Why?	Default passwords, ports & rules are "open doors" Failure and restart states often default to "insecure"
Principle	Force changes to security sensitive parameters Think through failures – must be secure but recoverable
Tradeoff	Convenience
Example	 On failure don't disable or reset security controls Don't allow default accounts with default passwords

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References per slide, at the end.

# 07	NEVER RELY ON OBSCURITY
Why?	Hiding things is difficult – someone is going to find them, accidental if not on purpose
Principle	Assume attacker with perfect knowledge, this forces secure system design
Tradeoff	Designing a truly secure system takes time and effort
Example	 Use reputable crypto Assume that an attacker will be able to guess password encodings, port knocking etc

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# 08	DEFENCE IN DEPTH
Why?	System do get attacked, breaches do happen, mistakes are made – need to minimise the impact
Principle	Don't rely on a single point of security, secure every level, vary mechanisms, stop failures at one level propagating
Tradeoff	Redundancy of policy, complex permissioning and troubleshooting, can make recovery harder
Example	 Access control in UI, services, database, OS Multiple layers of authentication (HW, SW, Users)

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References per slide, at the end.

# 09	NEVER INVENT SECURITY TECHNOLOGY
Why?	Security technology is difficult to create – specialist job, avoiding vulnerabilities is dificult
Principle	Don't create your own security technology Always use a proven component
Tradeoff	Time to assess security technology, effort to learning it, complexity
Example	 Don't invent your own SSO mechanism, secret storage or crypto libraries. Use industry standards!

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# 10	SECURE THE WEAKEST LINK
Why?	"Paper Wall" problem – common when focus is on technologies not threats
Principle	Find the weakest link in the security chain and strengthen it – repeat! (Threat modelling)
Tradeoff	Significant effort required, often reveals problems at the least convenient moment
Example	 Data privacy threat met with encrypted communication but with unencrypted database storage and backups

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References per slide, at the end.

The Force Multipliers Technical Controls

- Strong authentication (two factor: smart cards, yubikey, sms etc)
- Separation (physical and logical)
- Security logging
- White listening
- SANS/CIS 20 Critical Security Controls

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References per slide, at the end.

The Force Multipliers Engineering

- Know your network
 - Documentation vs Implementation
- Threat modeling
 - Crown Jewels
- Think in graphs
 - Not everything is equal

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Strong authentication

One of the few good security measures, every time!

Out of band authentication

- Civilian: Sms, google authenticator, mobilt bank-ID
- Military: Smart cards with external num-pads

In band authentication with physical token

- Smart cards
- Yubikeys

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Separation (physical and logical)

Separation of

- duties
- user space / kernel space
- admin console / user console
- Infrastructure management / operational management

Physical separation holds

No virtual overlap between domains

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Security logging

Do you even know what to log in your systems?

- Information flow diagrams
- Who's watching the results?
 - Automatic analysis
 - Manual analysis
- How do you protect your logs?
- How do you handle incident response?

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References per slide, at the end.



White listening

Most popular operating systems (Windows, Linux, etc.) have some sort of "deny-by-default" technology built into it:

- Windows has AppLocker
- In newer versions of Linux, using the integrity measurement architecture, module signing, and Secure Boot, it's possible to have a system where almost any change is detected. Also selinux ⁽²⁾
- **NetBSD** has the Veriexec subsystem



References per slide, at the end.

Graphs vs lists



Jackie 👮 Stokes @find evil

🏖 Föli

"Attackers think in graphs. Defenders think in lists." --@redteamwrangler #bsidesAugusta


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"If your security engineers don't like hard problems and novel solutions you have the wrong ones"


- Rich Smith, Etsy

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The security goal flow chart



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Credits and prior art 1/7

"discovering truth by building on previous discoveries"

Me, Myself & I

S02-05: Saab, the corporation video (6 min) - <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KsdPHsgR9Q</u>

S02-05: The domains of war - <u>https://saab.com/land/, https://saab.com/air/, https://saab.com/naval/, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare</u> S02-05: LinkedIn Cyber Security Domain Map - <u>https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/map-cybersecurity-domains-version-20-henry-jiang-ciso-cissp</u> S02-05: Nixu Oy at 600Minutes Information and Cyber Security 2017 (Spotlight) - This is Nixu - <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwIIJnZ8pHo</u>

SANS SEC530 – Defensible Security Architecure

S06-07: https://www.sans.org/course/defensible-security-architecture-and-engineering

Två typer av hot

S08-09: Aktörsdrivet vs icke aktörsdrivet hot H SÄK Grunder, 2013 - <u>https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/4-om-myndigheten/dokumentfiler/handbocker/h-sak-grunder.pdf</u> IT-Säkerhetsarkitektur, 2015 - <u>https://www.svk.se/siteassets/aktorsportalen/sakerhetsskydd/dokument/vagledning-it-sakerhetsarkitektur-final.pdf</u>

The Post-Breach Age - Quote

S10: Cybercrime Kill Chain vs. Defense Effectiveness - <u>https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258112939</u> Cybercrime Kill Chain vs Defense Effectiveness S10: Conference: Proceedings des 13. Deutschen Sicherheitskongress des BSI –

https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Veranstaltungen/ITSiKongress/13ter/Stefan Frei 16052013.pdf

Credits and prior art 2/7

"discovering truth by building on previous discoveries"

The Post-Breach Age - Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends 2018 report S11: Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends report - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf

MITRE's "assume breach" initiative

S12: Finding Cyber Threats with ATT&CK[™]-Based Analytics – <u>https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/16-3713-finding-cyber-threats%20with%20att%26ck-based-analytics.pdf</u>

S12: ATT&CK web page - https://attack.mitre.org

S12: ATT&CK conference 2018 - https://www.mitre.org/attackcon

ATT&CK – A more scientific way

S13: A short animated video about MITRE ATT&CK™ Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BEf6s1iu5g

- S13: Science It is the answer https://www.deviantart.com/dormantflame/art/Because-Science-390410617
- S13: The full ATT&CK Matrix https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/
- S13: 3 minutes on MITRE ATT&CK https://www.rapid7.com/resources/3-minutes-on-mitre-attack

Threat modeling

- S14-15: Threat Modeling 101: Ten Common Traps Not to Fall Into https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security/data-protection/threat-modeling-10-common-traps-you-dont-want-to-fall-into/
- S14-15: Threat Modeling: Designing for Security (624 pages) https://www.amazon.com/Threat-Modeling-Designing-Adam-Shostack/dp/1118809998?tag=viglink12354-20

Credits and prior art 3/7

"discovering truth by building on previous discoveries"

ATT&CK Matrix Use Cases

S16: The MITRE ATT&CK Framework – A Sign of the Times - https://www.threatq.com/mitre-attck-framework-blog/

ATT&CK – A Moving target

S17: ATT&CKing 2019 - https://medium.com/mitre-attack/attacking-2019-c05bccefed2d

APT Groups aka advance threat actors

S18: ATT&CK Groups: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/

- S18: The famous Mandiant/Fireeye report about APT1 (2013, Nov) <u>https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf</u> "Since 2006, Mandiant has observed APT1 compromise 141 companies spanning 20 major industries"
- S18: 2013 Report to Congress of the U.S. China Economic and Security review commission https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%202013%20Annual%20Report.PDF

The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK

S19-21: TripWire, Defend Your Data Now with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework - <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io4vCTBLa78</u> Slides - <u>https://www.slideshare.net/Tripwire/defend-your-data-now-with-the-mitre-attck-framework</u>

The ATT&CK Matrices

- S22: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/enterprise/
- S22: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/enterprise/

Credits and prior art 4/7

"discovering truth by building on previous discoveries"

Enterprise ATT&CK focus areas (tactics)

S23: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/enterprise/

The post-breach / "assume breach" age and how ATT&CK can help you leverage what you already have S24: Image - https://www.acsac.org/2017/workshops/icss/Otis-Alexander-ICS,%20Adversarial%20Tactics,%20Techniques.pdf

The digital sleeper agents of modern systems, or the rise of LOLBins

S25: LOLBins: Attackers Are Abusing Trusted Binaries to Target Organizations - https://blog.barkly.com/what-are-lolbins-living-off-the-land-binaries

ATT&CK and LOLBins or homesteading in the enterprise with fileless attacks

S26: Fileless Malware Attacks on the Rise, Microsoft Says - <u>https://www.securityweek.com/fileless-malware-attacks-rise-microsoft-says</u> S26: Carbon Black 2017 Threat Report -

https://www.carbonblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CB-Thread-Report-2017-122117.pdf S26: DerbyCon 3.0 Living Off The Land A Minimalists Guide To Windows Post Exploitation - https://youtu.be/j-r6UonEkUw

Simple examples of TTP

S27: TTP vs Indicator: A simple usage overview - <u>https://stixproject.github.io/documentation/concepts/ttp-vs-indicator/</u>S27: IOCs vs. TTPs - <u>https://azeria-labs.com/iocs-vs-ttps/</u>



Credits and prior art 5/7

"discovering truth by building on previous discoveries"

Biancos "Pyramid of Pain"

S28: The Pyramid of Pain - <u>http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html</u> S28: Employing the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix to Build and Validate Cybersecurity Mechanisms – https://www.apriorit.com/dev-blog/582-employing-the-mitre-att-ck-matrix

How to start with ATT&CK – Enterprise Tactics

S29: Enterprise Tactics - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/enterprise/

How to start with ATT&CK - Tactics - Techniques - Threat Groups - Tools

S30: ATT&CK Object Model Relationships - https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/mitre-attack-design-and-philosophy

How to start with ATT&CK - Work from tactics and break it down from there

S31: relationships between Tactics, Techniques, Software and Adversary Groups – https://www.splunk.com/blog/2019/01/15/att-ck-ing-the-adversary-episode-1-a-new-hope.html

One page security architecture

S32: http://www.firegenanalytics.com/downloads/one_page_security_architecture_v1.svg

Separation as a security boundary

S33: https://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-recommends-using-a-separate-device-for-administrative-tasks/



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"discovering truth by building on previous discoveries"

Security Design principles

S34-S46: GOTO 2016, Secure by Design - the Architect's Guide to Security Design Principles - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qN3JBGd1g8

The Force Multipliers - Technical Controls & Engineering

- S48: Strong Authentication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_authentication
- S48: Pass-the-hash attacks: Tools and Mitigation (53 pages)

https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/pass-the-hash-attacks-tools-mitigation-33283

- S48: YubiKey https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YubiKey
- S48: Smart Card https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_card
- S48: Google Authenticator https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google Authenticator
- S50: Security logging, DCShadow https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207/
- S50: Security logging, BlueHat IL 2018 Vincent Le Toux & Benjamin Delpy What Can Make Your Million Dollar SIEM Go Blind https://youtu.be/KILnU4FhQbc
- S47: Separation, DEF CON 24 Beyond the MCSE: Red Teaming Active Directory video (64 min)
 - <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tEfwmReo1Hk</u>
- S47: Separation, GOTO 2016 Microservices at Netflix Scale: Principles, Tradeoffs & Lessons Learned R. Meshenberg video (49 min) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=57UK46gfBLY
- S51: Top 10 Common Misconceptions About Application Whitelisting - <u>http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/top-10-common-misconceptions-application-whitelisting/#gref</u>
- S47: CIS Critical Security Controls v6.0 (2 pages) https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/critical-controls-poster-2016.pdf
- S47: CIS Critical Security Controls https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls
- S47: Defenders think in lists. Attackers think in graphs. As long as this is true, attackers win.
 - https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/johnla/2015/04/26/defenders-think-in-lists-attackers-think-in-graphs-as-long-as-this-is-true-attackers-win/

Credits and prior art 7/7

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The security goal flow chart

S54: The Evolution of Information Security Goals from the 1960s to today (30 slides) http://users.cs.cf.ac.uk/Y.V.Cherdantseva/LectureEvolutionInfoSecGOALS.pdf

A crash course in cyber, by <u>halvarflake</u> (<u>https://twitter.com/halvarflake/status/1126813939499773953</u>): https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1FGjvcmIWFtHfI_IEdr_khJFeSsLAYR_-Up0GHXtTCsM/edit#slide=id.p

Books you should read that might have been mentioned but aren't represented by a slide:

- Site Reliability Engineering, How Google Runs Production Systems (552 pages) http://shop.oreilly.com/product/0636920041528.do
- Vem kan man lita på?: den globala övervakningens framväxt (304 pages) <u>http://www.adlibris.com/se/bok/vem-kan-man-lita-pa-den-globala-overvakningens-framvaxt-9789175453958</u>

 Konsten att gissa rätt Underrättelsevetenskapens grunder (218 pages) -
- https://www.adlibris.com/se/bok/konsten-att-gissa-ratt---underrattelsevetenskapens-grunder-9789144004389
- The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (384 pages) <u>https://www.amazon.com/Perfect-Weapon-Sabotage-Fear-Cyber/dp/0451497899</u>

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